LAndmark judgmentS
Constitutionality of the Death Penalty
i. Jagmohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1973) 1 SCC 20
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 173 of 1971
Coram: S.M. Sikri, A.N. Ray, I.D. Dua, D.G. Palekar, M.H. Bed, JJ.
Author: D.G. Palekar, J.
Decided on: October 3, 1972
Full text available here
Facts
The Appellant was convicted under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, 1860 and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court granted leave limited to the question of sentence. Arguments were raised regarding the constitutionality of the death penalty on grounds that there was too wide a discretion vested in courts since no standards or guidelines were available, and that it violated Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950.
Findings
The Supreme Court held that the right to life was not a part of Article 19 and the death penalty could not be called unreasonable or opposed to public policy. The framers of the Constitution were aware of capital punishment as permissble under law which is evidenced by provisions like Article 72 (1) (c), Article 73 (3), Article 134 etc. The implication of these provisions is that the deprivation of life is constitutionally permissible if it is done according to the procedure established by law. The Court also took notice of the 35th Report of the Law Commission of India which recommended the retention of capital punishment. It was held that Article 14, Constitution of India, 1950 can hardly be invoked in matters of judicial discretion since the exercise of discretion in each case would be peculiar to its facts and circumstances. The discretion given to courts is to impose the death penalty after balancing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and it cannot be called unguided. Further, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, lays down detailed procedures as to when a death sentence can be imposed and the imposition of the death sentence, following the procedure established by law, cannot be called unconstitutional.
ii. Rajendra Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1979) 3 SCC 646
Type: Criminal Appeal NO. 512-513 OF 1978
Coram: A.N. Sen, D.A. Desai, V.R. Krishna Iyer, JJ.
Author: V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. (Majority Opinion); A.N. Sen, J. (Minority Opinion)
Decided on: February 9, 1979
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Facts
The Appellant had been sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and had been granted pardon. He committed a murder on his release. The case came up as a criminal appeal and the Court was to determine whether the case qualified as having ‘special reasons’ required under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to impose the death sentence.
Findings
The Supreme Court was dealing with the issue of sentencing discretion. It was stated that to hold that the discretion is ruled by well recognized principles alone is not sufficient. It must be further demarcated as to what these principles are so that the practice of the discretion does not militate against the mandate under Article 21, Constitution of India, 1950 of fair and non-arbitrary procedures. It was held that the special reasons for giving the death sentence cannot pertain only to the crime but must account for human rights and the fundamental freedoms given in the Constitution. The reasons must show why a life sentence would not suffice. Since taking life destroys the dignity of a person, the reasons must show why such a drastic step is justified; consequently, it can only be in exceptional circumstances that such a step must be taken. It was further held that the death sentence abrogates fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India, 1950 and therefore the exercise of the discretionary power to impose the death sentence must show that such a sentence is a reasonable restriction otherwise it would be violative of the Constitution.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sen stated that it was constitutionally and legally impermissible for the Supreme Court while hearing an appeal on the question of sentence to restructure Section 302 Indian Penal Code, 1860.
iii. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 273 of 1979
Coram: Y.V. Chandrachud, CJ., P.N. Bhagwati, R.S. Sarkaria, A.C. Gupta, N.L. Untwalia, JJ.
Author: R.S. Sarkaria, J (Majority Judgment), P.N Bhagwati (Dissent)
Decided on: May 9, 1980
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Facts
A batch of writ petitions was filed in the Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of the death penalty as an alternative punishment for murder under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Findings
The Constitution Bench affirmed the ruling in Jagmohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh with some changes. It was observed that the scope and import of Articles 19 and 21 was expanded by the interpretation given to them in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248. India had also become a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Court held that this fact had no impact on the constitutionality of death penalty as the Covenant did not outlaw death penalty. It was held that Article 19, Constitution of India, 1950 can be invoked only when one of the freedoms mentioned in it are infringed. Since the right to life is not a part of Article 19, it cannot be invoked to determine the constitutionality of Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860 which provides death penalty as an alternative punishment for murder. The death penalty cannot be called unconstitutional merely because it indirectly, incidentally or remotely affects the freedoms mentioned under Article 19, Constitution of India, 1950.
The Court interpreted Article 21, Constitution of India, 1950 as expanded in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India to state that the founding fathers recognised the right of the State to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty in accordance with fair, just and reasonable procedure established by valid law. The Court analysed Sections 235 and 354, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and came to the conclusion that Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860 was not violative of Article 21, Constitution of India, 1950. In answering whether the death penalty serves any penological purpose, the Court held that it would not be right to decide the issue judicially since it was a highly contested debate with strong divergent views on both sides. The Court clarified Jagmohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and held that the mandatory requirement of a pre-sentencing hearing introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 made it necessary not only to consider the circumstances of the crime but also that of the criminal.
In a dissenting opinion, reported as Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1982) 3 SCC 24, Justice Bhagwati stated that the imposition of the death penalty as an alternative to life imprisonment under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, 1860 was unconstitutional as it conferred unfettered discretion on courts to choose between the death penalty and life imprisonment.
iv. Mithu v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 277
Type: Criminal Appeal 745 of 1980
Coram: Y.V. Chandrachud, CJ., A. Vardaranjan, O. Chinappa Reddy, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, V.D. Tulzapurkar, JJ.
Author: Y.V. Chandrachud, CJ., O. Chinappa Reddy, J. (Concurring)
Decided on: April 7, 1983
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Facts
Section 303 Indian Penal Code, 1860 laid down mandatory death sentence for the offence of murder committed by a person undergoing life imprisonment. The case challenges the constitutional validity of the section as violating Article 21, Constitution of India, 1950.
Findings
The Supreme Court held that the mandate of Articles 14 and 21, Constitution of India, 1950 is that every procedure established under law must be fair, just and non-arbitrary. There is no rationale for drawing a distinction between a person who commits murder and a person who commits murder while serving a life sentence so as to make the death sentence mandatory for the latter class. It would be a savage punishment to impose a mandatory death sentence on a category of persons on an assumption that life convicts are dangerous per se. A standardized mandatory sentence of death deprives courts of the exercise of its discretion and is, therefore, harsh, unjust and unfair. Section 303 Indian Penal Code, 1860 was struck down as being unconstitutional.
v. Chhannulal Verma v. State of Chattisgarh (2019) 12 SCC 438
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 1482-83 OF 2018
Coram: Kurian Joseph, Deepak Gupta, Hemant Gupta, JJ.
Author: Kurian Joseph
Decided on: November 28, 2018
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Facts
The appellant was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of three persons. Conviction and sentence were confirmed by the High Court and the appellant challenged both before the Supreme Court.
Findings
Conviction of the appellant was confirmed and the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment taking into consideration the possibility of reform and rehabilitation of the appellant that was evidenced by his good conduct in prison.
On the issue of the future of the death penalty in India, Justice Kurian Joseph, in his dissent noticed that various benches have over a period of time expressed concerns regarding the inconsistent application of the principles laid down in Bachan Singh v. Union of India. Having regard to the 262nd Report of the Law Commission of India which stated that the constitutional regulation of capital punishment attempted in Bachan Singh has failed to prevent death sentences from being “arbitrarily and freakishly imposed” and that capital punishment has failed to achieve any constitutionally valid penological goals, Justice Joseph stated that the time had come to review the need for the death penalty as a punishment.
The majority opinion on this point stated that there was no need to re-examine the constitutionality of the death penalty in light of the decision in Bachan Singh.
vi. Vikram Singh and ors. v. State of Punjab (2015) 9 SCC 502
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 824 of 2013
Coram: T.S Thakur, R.K. Agarwal, Adarsh Kumar Goel JJ.
Author: T.S. Thakur, J.
Decided on: August 21, 2015
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Facts
This was an appeal against the dismissal of the writ petition filed by the appellant before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana challenging the constitutionality of Section 364 A Indian Penal Code, 1860. The writ petition was filed after the Supreme Court had upheld the conviction and death sentence imposed on the appellant under Sections 302, 364 A, 120 B and 201 Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Findings
The Supreme Court, while upholding its constitutional validity, held that under Section 364 A Indian Penal Code, 1860 courts have the discretion to impose the death sentence or life imprisonment. The Court noticed that the need for insertion of Section 364 A Indian Penal Code, 1860 arose because of the increase in kidnapping and abduction for ransom by ordinary criminals and also by terrorist organizations. Considering the background in which the law was enacted, the Court held that it could not be said that the punishment prescribed by the Parliament was disproportionate to the offence for it to be declared unconstitutional.
vii. Indian Harm Reduction Network v. Union of India 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 715
Type: Criminal Writ Petition No. 1784 and 1790 of 2010 (High Court of Bomaby)
Coram: A.M. Khanwilkar, A.P. Bhangale, JJ.
Author: A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
Decided on: June 16, 2011
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Facts
The petition challenged the constitutional validity of Section 31 A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“NDPS Act”) on the ground that the mandatory death sentence prescribed therein is violative of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950.
Findings
The Bombay High Court rejected the challenge under Article 14, Constitution of India, 1950 holding that there was a rational nexus and intelligible differentia to the object sought to be achieved by the law. However, it held that Section 31 A was violative of Article 21, Constitution of India, 1950. The Court stated that Section 31 A, NDPS Act, leaves no option to the Court but to impose the death penalty. Further, even though the sentence provided under Section 31 A, NDPS Act is of death penalty, the Court is not required to record special reasons, unlike the other crimes under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or for other offences under the provisions of the NDPS Act. Similarly, it makes the pre-sentence hearing under Section 235(2) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 irrelevant. The Court stated that there is no express provision in the NDPS Act to override the mandate of Sections 235(2) and 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Instead of declaring Section 31-A as unconstitutional, the Bombay High Court held that the provision should be construed as being directory by reading down the expression "shall be punishable with death" as "may be punishable with death".
viii. Mohd. Kasim Mohd Hasim Shaikh v. State Of Maharashtra 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 2508
Type: Writ Petition No. 1181 of 2014 (High Court of Bombay)
Coram: B.P. Dharmadhikari, Revati Mohite Dere, JJ.
Author: Revati Mohite Dere, J.
Decided on: June 3, 2019
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Facts
This case dealt with a challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 376 E Indian Penal Code, 1860 which provides for punishment of life imprisonment till the remainder of natural life or death for repeat offenders under Sections 376, 376 A, 376 AB, 376 D, 376 DA Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Findings
The Bombay High Court noted that Section 376 E did not create a new punishment of imprisonment for life as the Supreme Court has held that life imprisonment means imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural life. It held that the term imprisonment for life used in Section 418 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is to be understood to mean imprisonment till the remainder of one's natural life and hence, there is a mechanism in place to execute such a sentence. It found that therefore there is no violation of Article 21,Constitution of India, 1950 as there is a procedure for implementation and execution of the sentence of imprisonment for life, which means till the remainder of one's life, under Section 376 E, Indian Penal Code, 1860. It was held that a life convict has a constitutional right to apply for remission under Articles 72 and 161, Constitution of India, 1950 but has no unfettered statutory right to claim remission. The Court finally held that the background in which 376 E, Indian Penal Code, 1860 was enacted shows the concern of the Parliament for the safety and security of women and children and as such, cannot be dubbed as being either arbitrary or outrageously disproportionate or violative of Articles 14 and 21, Constitution of India, 1950.
ix. Deena v. Union of India (1983) 4 SCC 645
Type: Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 196 of 1983
Coram: Y.V. Chandrachud, CJ., R.S. Pathak, Sabyasachi Mukherjee, JJ.
Author: Y.V. Chandrachud, CJ., Sabyasachi Mukherjee J. (concurring)
Decided on: September 23, 1983
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Facts
Section 354 (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides for execution of the death sentence by hanging. The constitutional validity of this section was challenged on the grounds that the method of execution was barbaric and torturous and was impermissible under Article 21, Constitution of India, 1950.
Findings
The Supreme Court discussed the various methods used for execution across the world and held that no particular method had been shown to have any distinct or demonstrable advantage over hanging. It observed that some pain would be implicit in the causing of death, which alone cannot be reason to hold the method of execution as unconstitutional. What must be ensured is that there must be no torture or degradation of dignity caused to a person in the various steps attendant to an execution, and the process must not become a form of punishment on its own. It observed that hanging causes the least pain as death supervenes immediately. Moreover, there are safeguards in place to ensure no accidents take place or that no more pain is inflicted than is absolutely essential to cause death. Thus, the method of execution by hanging was held to be constitutionally permissible.
Role of Reformation
i. Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 498
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 1478 of 2005
Coram: S.B. Sinha, Cyriac Joseph, JJ,
Author: S.B. Sinha
Decided on: May 13, 2009
Full text available here
Facts
This was an appeal in the Supreme Court against the conviction and death sentence imposed for the offence of kidnapping and murder.
Findings
The Court upheld the conviction while commuting the death sentence of the appellant to life imprisonment.
The Court, relying upon dictum laid down in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab held that the death sentence can only be given when, firstly, it belongs to the rarest of rare category and secondly, when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed. It went on to hold that the alternative punishment of life imprisonment would be completely futile, only when the sentencing aim of reformation can be said to be unachievable. The Court will have to provide clear evidence as to why the convict is not fit for any kind of reformatory and rehabilitation scheme.
ii. Rajesh Kumar v State through government of NCT of Delhi (2011) 13 SCC 706
Type: Criminal Appeal Nos. 1871-1872 of 2011
Coram: D.K. Jain, A.K. Ganguly, JJ.
Author: A.K. Ganguly, J.
Decided on: September 28, 2011
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Facts
This case involved an appeal by the convict sentenced to death for the murder of two minors.
Findings
The Supreme Court noted that the state had brought no evidence to show that the convict was beyond reform and rehabilitation, in terms of the dictum of Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab
It further held that the High Court had erred by noting the same to be a neutral circumstance. The Court held that the very fact that the state had not given any evidence to show that the convict was beyond reform and rehabilitation was a mitigating circumstance in itself.
The Court commuted the sentence of death to imprisonment for life.
iii. Chhannu Lal Verma v. State of Chattisgarh (2019) 12 SCC 438
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 1482-83 of 2018
Coram: Kurian Joseph, Deepak Gupta, Hemant Gupta, JJ.
Author: Kurian Joseph, J.
Decided on: November 28, 2018
Full text available here
Facts
This was an appeal against a death sentence by a prisoner from Chhattisgarh, for the offence of multiple murders.
Findings
Condemning the manner in which the death sentence had been given in this case, the Supreme Court expressed its concern at the arbitrary manner in which the death penalty is imposed.
The Court emphasized the importance of factoring in the possibility of reform as a mitigating factor. It also reiterated Bachan Singh’s guidelines which call for the state to prove by evidence that the convict cannot be reformed or rehabilitated. In this case, the Court called for the prison report of the appellant and finding it to be a positive report, the Court considered it to be indicative of reform. The Court also stressed the importance of a psychological/psychiatric assessment to be done by the State to conclude that there is no possibility of reform. The Court commuted the sentence of death to life imprisonment.
iv. Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v State of Maharashtra (2019) 12 SCC 460
Type: Review petitions (Criminal) Nos. 306-307 of 2013
Coram: Madan B. Lokur, S Abdul Nazeer, Deepak Gupta, JJ.
Author: Madan B. Lokur, J.
Decided on: December 12, 2018
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Facts
In this case, the Supreme Court was deciding the review petition of a convict sentenced to death for the rape and murder of a minor.
Findings
The Court looked at various other decisions of the Supreme Court to conclude that ‘the probability (not possibility or improbability or impossibility) that a convict can be reformed and rehabilitated in society must be seriously and earnestly considered by the courts before awarding the death sentence.’ It further held that to effectuate this mandate, it is the obligation on the prosecution to prove to the Court, through evidence, that the probability is that the convict cannot be reformed or rehabilitated. Importantly, the Court held that the convict could also produce evidence on the aspect of reformation. It was also held that even if social reintegration of the convict is not possible, the option of a longer duration of imprisonment is permissible.
Consequently, the Court commuted the sentence of death to life imprisonment till the end of natural life, with no release.
Same Day Sentencing and Remedying Sentencing Defects
i. Santa Singh v. State of Punjab
Citation:(1976) 4 SCC 190
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 230 of 1976
Coram: P.N. Bhagwati, Syed Murtaza Fazal Ali, JJ.
Author: P.N. Bhagwati, J.
Decided on: August 17, 1976
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Facts
The Appellant was convicted for the murder of his mother and her second husband. He was sentenced to death on the same day on which he was convicted by the Trial Court.
Findings
The Supreme Court held that sentencing is an important stage in the process of administration of criminal justice and required an interdisciplinary approach. The words “hear the accused” in Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 meant that the accused had to be given an opportunity place before the Court various circumstances relating to the sentence, and was not limited to just an oral hearing. It was further stated that non-compliance of Section 235(2) is not an irregularity curable under Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as it amounts to omitting an important stage of the trial.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Fazl Ali stated that an opportunity to give evidence in respect of sentence may necessitate an adjournment; and to avoid delay, the adjournment ordinarily should be for not more than 14 days. The matter was remanded to the Trial Court for giving an opportunity to the accused to make a representation regarding the sentence.
ii. Dagdu v. State of Maharashtra
Citation:(1977) 3 SCC 68
Type: Criminal Appeal Nos. 437 & 438 Of 1976.
Coram: Y.V. Chandrachud, P.K. Goswami, P.N. Shingal,JJ.
Author: Y.V. Chandrachud
Decided on: April 19, 1977
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Facts
The case involved the trial of 18 persons for the death of 10 women. The Trial Court had sentenced 3 persons to death and 4 to life imprisonment. On appeal, the High Court upheld the death sentence of one of the accused (the other two were acquitted) and enhanced the punishment of 3 accused from life imprisonment by imposing the death sentence.
Findings
The Supreme Court held that the decision in Santa Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190 cannot be read to say that failure on the part of the court to 'hear’ an accused on the question of sentence must necessarily entail a remand to then trial court. After convicting an accused, courts must unquestionably hear him on the question of sentence but if they omit to do so, it would be open to the higher court to remedy the breach by giving a real and effective hearing to the accused on the question of sentence. The accused must be permitted to adduce before the Court all the data which he desires to adduce on the question of sentence. The Court may adjourn the matter in order to give to the accused sufficient time to make submissions on sentence. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted liberty to the accused persons to produce materials on the question of sentence.
iii. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu
Citation: (1981) 3 SCC 11
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 221 of 1981.
Coram: Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J., A.P. Sen, J.
Author: Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J.
Decided on: March 18, 1981
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Facts
The Appellant was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of his mother’s brother and his son.
Findings
The Supreme Court held that the obligation to hear the accused on the question of sentence, which is imposed by Section 235(2) of the Code of criminal Procedure, 1973 is not discharged by putting a formal question to the accused as to what he has to say on the question of sentence. The sentencing judge must make a genuine effort to elicit from the accused all information which will eventually have a bearing on the question of sentence. The section casts a duty on the judge to set aside formalities of procedure and approach the question of sentence from a broad sociological point of view. In the facts of the case, the Court felt it was unsafe to confirm the death sentence and commuted the sentence to life imprisonment.
iv. Allauddin Mian and Ors. v. State of Bihar
Citation: (1989) 3 SCC 5
Type: Criminal Appeal Nos. 343 and 446 of 1988
Coram: A.M. Ahmadi and S. Natrajan, JJ.
Author: A.M. Ahmadi, J.
Decided on: April 13, 1989
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Facts
The Appellants were convicted and sentenced to death on the same day for the murder of two infants.
Findings
The Supreme Court held that Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 satisfies two purposes; first, it gives an opportunity to the accused to be heard; second, it helps courts choose the sentence. It was held that as a general rule trial courts should, after recording the conviction, adjourn the matter to a future date and call upon both the prosecution as well as the defense to place relevant material on the question of sentence before it and thereafter pronounce the sentence. The Supreme Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment by holding that there was insufficient material to choose the sentence.
v. Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab
Citation: (1991) 4 SCC 341
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 490 of 1985
Coram: K. Ramaswamy, A.M. AHmadi and V. Ramaswamy, JJ.
Author: K. Ramaswamy, J.
Decided on: April 10, 1991
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Facts
The Appellants were convicted for the death of four persons under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and were sentenced to death on the same day as their conviction.
Findings
It was held by the Supreme Court that the hearing contemplated under Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not confined to an oral hearing but was also intended to afford an opportunity to the prosecution as well as the accused to place before the Court facts and materials relating to various factors on the question of sentence. Therefore, sufficient time must be given to the accused or the prosecution on the question of sentence.
The Court stated that in view of previous decisions of the Supreme Court, sentences awarded on the day of conviction are not in accordance with the law. That would normally have the effect of remanding the case to the Special Court for reconsideration. However, in view of the fact that the Appellant was incarcerated for six years from the date of conviction it was felt that there was no need to remand the matter for further evidence. The death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.
vi. Ajay Pandit v. State of Maharashtra
Citation: (2012) 8 SCC 43
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 864 of 2006
Coram: K.S. Radhakrishnan and Dipak Misra, JJ.
Author: K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.
Decided on: July 17, 2012
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Facts
The Appellant was a dentist convicted and sentenced to death on the same day for drugging and killing two persons for money whilst pretending to help them obtain a visa with the help of his contacts in the American Embassy.
Findings
The conviction was confirmed by the Supreme Court. However, the death sentence was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court on the question of sentence. It was held that no genuine effort had been made by the High Court to elicit any information either from the accused or the prosecution regarding the existence of any circumstances which might influence the court to avoid the death sentence. It stated that awarding the death sentence is an exception, not the rule and is to be imposed only in the “rarest of rare” cases. It emphasized the duty and obligation of the High Court to elicit relevant facts even if the accused has kept totally silent in such situations.
vii. Mukesh v. State for NCT of Delhi and Ors.
Citation: (2017) 3 SCC 717
Type: Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No. 3119-3120 of 2014, 5027-5028 of 2014
Coram: Dipak Misra, R. Banumathi and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.
Author: Dipak Misra, J.
Decided on: February 3, 2017
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Facts
The Appellants were convicted for the rape and murder of a 23 year old woman in the national capital. During the hearing before the Supreme Court, the question of remanding the matter to the trial court arose, on the question of sentencing, leading to this interim order of the Supreme Court.
Findings
It was argued by the accused persons that the Trial Judge had not considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in respect of each individual accused. The Court went through the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Santa Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190, Dagdu v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 3 SCC 68, Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab, (1991) 4 SCC 341 and Ajay Pandit v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 8 SCC 43 and held that there are two modes to cure sentencing defects- 1. to remand the matter; 2. to direct the accused persons to produce necessary data and advance the contention on the question of sentence. Following the second mode, the Court gave an opportunity to the accused persons to file affidavits along with documents stating the mitigating circumstances. The counsels for the accused were allowed daily visits to the prison in order to communicate with the accused persons and file the requisite affidavits and materials. The prosecution was also granted liberty to file affidavits in response to the ones filed by the accused. The final judgment in this case was delivered on May 5, 2017 reported as Mukesh and Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2017) 6 SCC 1.
viii. Accused X v. State of Maharashtra
Citation: (2019) 7 SCC 1
Type: Review Petition (Criminal) No. 301 Of 2008 in Criminal Appeal No. 680 of 2007
Coram: N.V. Ramana, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Indira Banerjee, JJ.
Author: N.V. Ramana, J.
Decided on: April 12, 2019
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Facts
This was a case in which the accused had been convicted and sentenced to death for the rape and murder of two minor girls. The conviction and sentence was confirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court. The review petition was dismissed and was reopened pursuant to the order of the Supreme Court in Mohd Arif v. The Registrar, Supreme Court of India (2014) 9 SCC 737.
Findings
The Court held that the object of Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was to provide an opportunity for an accused to present mitigating circumstances which could also be done by hearing the parties on the day of the conviction order. It was held that meaningful hearing under Section 235(2) is to be measured qualitatively and not quantitatively. Further, the Court stated that noncompliance of Section 235(2) can be rectified before an appellate court which could either afford an opportunity before itself to produce mitigation materials or remand the matter to the trial court. In the facts of the case it was felt that the accused had been given a real and effective opportunity. The death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment without remission on the ground of post-conviction mental illness.
ix. Md. Mannan @ Abdul Mannan v. State of Bihar
Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 737
Type: Review Petition (Criminal) No. 308 of 2011 in Criminal Appeal No. 379 of 2009
Coram: N.V. Ramana, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Indira Banerjee, JJ.
Decided on: February 14, 2019
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Facts
The Supreme Court was deciding a review petition in a case where the Petitioner was convcited and sentenced to death for the rape and murder of a minor.
Findings
The Supreme Court held that the imposition of death sentence on the same day as the conviction may not, in itself, vitiate the sentence, provided that the convict is given a meaningful and effective hearing on the question of sentence under Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 with an opportunity to bring on record mitigating factors. It was held, that the preponement by the trial court of the hearing under Section 235(2) at a short notice, which in effect was no notice, had denied the petitioner an effective hearing as the hearing under Section 235(2) was reduced to a mere formality. The death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment without remission.
Clemency Powers and Supervening Circumstances
i. Kehar Singh v. Union of India
Citation:1989 (1) SCC 204
Type: Writ Petition (Criminal) Nos. 526-527 Of 1988
Coram: R.S. Pathak, C.J., E.S. Venkataramiah, M.N. Venkatachaliah, N.D. Ojha and Ranganath Mishra, JJ.
Author: R.S. Pathak, J.
Decided on: December 16, 1988
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Facts
Kehar Singh was sentenced to death for his role in the assassination of Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister. A mercy petition filed by his son was rejected by the President, stating that the President could not go into the merits of a case decided by the Supreme Court. This was the question being considered here.
Findings
The Constitution Bench held that the powers of mercy under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India, 1950 were on a whole different plane from the powers of the courts, and it is open to the President to scrutinize the evidence and even come to a different conclusion from that recorded by the courts. It is even open to the President to grant an oral hearing, though such a hearing cannot be claimed as a right by the prisoner.
The Court also held that the exercise of power by the President was open to Judicial Review to a limited extent The Court cannot go into the merits of the decision taken by the President but can ensure that the decision-making process met with the procedural requirements and the principles laid down in the constitution.Consequently, the Court remanded the mercy petition to the President for fresh consideration.
ii. Epuru Sudhakar v. Union of India
Citation:(2006) 8 SCC 161
Type: Writ Petition (Criminal) 284 of 2005 and 285 of 2005 with Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 284-285 of 2006
Coram: Arijit Pasayat and S.H. Kapadia, JJ.
Author: Arijit Pasayat, J.
Decided on: October 11, 2006
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Facts
This was a writ petition challenging the grant of remission by the Governor to a convict under Article 161 of the Constitution, on grounds of it being occasioned by the Governor considering irrelevant factors and material.
Findings
In this case, the Supreme Court laid down the administrative law standards of judicial review of the constitutional powers under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India, 1950. After looking at several authorities worldwide as well as in India, it crystallised the standards of review under five broad heads, in cases where-
- The order had been passed without application of mind, or
- The order is malafide,or
- The order is passed on extraneous or wholly irrelevant considerations,or
- Relevant materials have been kept out of consideration,or
- The order is arbitrary
The Court used its power of review in this case and remanded the matter back to the Governor for reconsideration.
iii. T.V. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu
Citation: (1983) 2 SCC 68
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 75 of 1983
Coram:O. Chinnappa Reddy and R.B. Mishra, JJ.
Author:O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.
Decided on: February 16, 1983
Full Text Available Here
Facts
The facts of this case do not pertain to a post mercy situation, but it is relevant in how it introduces the jurisprudence of delay in death sentence cases. The prisoner in this case had been on death row for eight years when his appeal came before a division bench of the Supreme Court.
Findings
The Supreme Court commuted the sentence of death to life imprisonment in this case, holding that the prolonged delay in executing a sentence of death violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950. It also laid down, as a principle, that a delay of two years in executing a sentence of death (from the time it is first passed by the Trial Court) would be sufficient to entitle the prisoner to have his sentence quashed and commuted to life imprisonment.
iv. Sher Singh v. State of Punjab
Citation: (1983) 2SCC 344
Type: Writ Petitions Nos. 232 and 233 of 1983
Coram: Y.V. Chandrachud, CJ, V.D. Tulzapurkar and A. Varadarajan, JJ.
Author:Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J.
Decided on:March 24, 1983
Full Text Available Here
Facts
Shortly after the verdict in T.V. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, a different and larger ( 3 judge) bench of the Supreme Court considered the writ petition of two prisoners who had been on death row for close to seven years, after their SLP and review petitions had already been dismissed.
Findings
The Court held that delay as a supervening circumstance would be relevant to interfere with a death sentence, even after the appeal had been dismissed by the Supreme Court, on grounds of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950. It however disagreed with Vatheeswaran to the extent that no fixed cap of delay (like the limit of 2 years in Vatheeswaran) could be laid down , beyond which a death sentence would be deemed in-executable. It also held that it is to be determined whether the delay is at the instance of the prisoner. The nature of the offence and other diverse circumstances would be relevant in the final determination. Further, the Court opined that a ‘self imposed rule’ should be followed by the executive authorities that all mercy petitions should be decided within three months of their receipt.
v. Triveniben v. State of Gujarat
Citation: (1989) 1 SCC 678
Type: Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 1566 of 1985
Coram: G.L. Oza, K. Jagannatha Shetty, K.N. Singh, L.M. Sharma And M.M. Dutt, JJ.
Author: G.L. Oza and K. Jagannatha Shetty, JJ.
Decided on: February 7, 1989
Full Text Available Here
Facts
A bunch of matters came before a five judge bench, for the purpose of resolving the conflict emerging from the divergent dictums of Vatheeswaran and Sher Singh, as to whether a fixed time limit can be imposed beyond which the delay would render a sentence of death in-executable.
Findings
It was held by the majority opinion that only the delay that transpired after the final judgment of the Apex Court could be considered, i.e the delay at the instance of the executive. Long or inordinate delay would be a relevant factor to seek commutation of death sentence in such proceedings, but it would not be open to the writ court to re-appreciate on merits the final verdict already reached by the Apex Court in appeal. It also overruled Vatheeswaran and held that no fixed cap can be imposed on the period of delay for the purpose of executing a sentence of death.
Justice Shetty, in his concurring opinion, also added that the circumstances of the crime are to be considered as well in considering whether to commute a sentence on the basis of inordinate delay.
vi. Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India
Citation: 2014 (3) SCC 1
Type: Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 55 Of 2013
Coram:P. Sathasivam, C.J., Ranjan Gogoi, and Shiva Kirti Singh, JJ.
Author: P. Sathasivam, C.J.
Decided on: January 21, 2014
Full Text Available Here
Facts
Fifteen death row prisoners approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950 after the mercy petitions had been rejected by the Governor and the President after varying periods of delay. Commutation of sentence was sought on grounds of undue delay, mental illness and solitary confinement.
Findings
The three judge bench held that supervening circumstances like delay, solitary confinement, and insanity were relevant considerations at the post- mercy stage. On delay, it was held that ‘undue, unexplained and inordinate delay’ in execution due to pendency of mercy petition, would on its own be a ground to commute the sentence of death. Further, the Court read the opinion of Justice Shetty in Triveniben v. State of Gujarat to be a dissenting one, and laid down that the gravity and nature of the offence would be irrelevant at this stage.
The Court also laid down a list of guidelines relating to sending and disposal of mercy petitions, as well as execution of sentence.
vii. Ajay Kumar Pal v. Union of India
Citation: (2015) 2 SCC 478
Type: Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 128 of 2014
Coram: Dipak Misra, Rohinton Fali Nariman and Uday Umesh Lalit, JJ.
Author: Uday Umesh Lalit, J.
Decided on: December 12, 2014
Full Text Available Here
Facts
This was a writ filed by a prisoner whose mercy petition had been rejected by the President.
Findings
The Supreme Court held that in light of the law laid down in Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, the delay of 3 years and 10 months in deciding the mercy petition combined with the fact of solitary confinement was enough to establish a violation of rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 and entitle the petitioner to a commutation.
Rarest of Rare - Meaning and Judicial Critique
i. Ediga Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1974) 4 SCC 443
Citation: (1974) 4 SCC 443
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 67 of 1973
Coram: V.R. Krishna Iyer and R.S. Sarkaria, JJ.
Author: V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.
Decided on: February 11 1974
Full text available here
Facts
The appeal before the Supreme Court pertained to a woman convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a woman and her child.
Findings
The Supreme Court, while considering the question of sentence, came up with a list of ‘positive indicators against death sentence under Indian law’. It found that both young age and old age would be relevant factors to be considered in favour of the convict. It also held that ‘socio-economic, psychic or penal compulsions’ that might not be enough to warrant a legal exception might still be relevant as sentencing factors. The Court enumerated other favourable factors, like the culpability of other accused persons, the lack of premeditation, and the duration of time spent under sentence of death. On the other hand, the manner of commission of the crime, the weapon used, the nature of the victim would be among the factors relevant to impose a sterner sentence.
It was held that since crime and punishment are functionally related to society, the prevailing societal conditions must be taken into consideration and the deterrent element of punishment must be balanced with the possibility of reformation of the individual.
In the facts of this case, the Court commuted the sentence of death to life imprisonment.
ii. Rajendra Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh
Citation: (1979) 3 SCC 646
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 512-513 Of 1978
Coram: A.N. Sen, D.A. Desai, V.R. Krishna Iyer, JJ.
Author: V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. (Majority Opinion); A.N. Sen, J. (Minority Opinion)
Decided on: February 9, 1979
Full text available here
Facts
The Appellant had been sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and had been granted pardon. He committed a murder on his release. The case came up as a criminal appeal and the Supreme Court was to determine whether the case qualified as having ‘special reasons’ required under Section 354(3), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to impose death sentence.
Findings
This was the first case where the Supreme Court discussed the “special reason” mentioned in Section 354 (3), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court in its analysis held that special reasons related not to the crime but to the criminal. One of the tests for imposing the death penalty is to determine if the person poses a traumatic threat to the survival of the social order. The death penalty must be imposed where the peril to social security is to such an extent that extinction of such a person becomes essential for the survival of society.
The majority, speaking through Justice Krishna Iyer, also acknowledged the class bias implicit in the administration of the death penalty, noting that white collar or corporate criminals who inflict mass death through their economic or environmental offences rarely have to fear the gallows. The majority observed that criminals belonging to this category also deserve the death sentence, though it is rarely given to them.
The death sentence of the appellants was commuted to life imprisonment by the majority judgment, with the dissenting opinion of Justice Sen upholding the sentence of death.
iii. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684
Citation: (1980) 2 SCC 684
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 273 Of 1979
Coram: Y.V. Chandrachud, CJ., P.N. Bhagwati, R.S. Sarkaria, A.C. Gupta, N.l. Untwalia, JJ.
Author: R.S. Sarkaria, J (Majority Judgment)
Decided on: May 9, 1980
Full text available here
Facts
A batch of Writ Petitions were filed in the Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of the death penalty as an alternative punishment for murder under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860 .
Findings
While upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty, the Supreme Court stated that the mandatory requirement of a pre-sentencing hearing introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 made it necessary not only to consider the circumstances of the crime, but also those of the criminal.The Constitution Bench also overruled Rajendra Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh ,holding that ‘special reasons’ cannot just pertain to the criminal alone.
The Court enumerated several circumstances as indicators of aggravating and mitigating circumstances relevant for determining sentence. Young age of the accused, the probability of reform and rehabilitation, lack of recidivism, mental condition were some of the mitigating factors illustrated by the Court.
It was stated that the sentencing policy enshrined in Section 354 (3), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, entailed that the scope and concept of mitigating factors must be interpreted liberally and expansively. The Court reiterated that life imprisonment is the rule and the death sentence is an exception which, the Court held, should be imposed only in the “rarest of rare” cases when the alternative option of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed.
iv. Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab
Citation: (1983) 3 SCC 470
Type:Criminal Appeal No. 78 of 1981
Coram: M.P. Thakkar, A. Varadarajan, Syed Murtaza Fazalali, JJ.
Author: M.P. Thakkar, J.
Decided on: July 20, 1983
Full text available here
Facts
17 members of a family were murdered due to an on-going feud between two families. Death sentence was given to the appellants by the Trial Court and the sentence was confirmed by the High Court. In appeal before the Supreme Court, the question was whether the case satisfied the standard of ‘rarest of the rare’ laid down in Bachan Singh v. Union of India.
Findings
In assessing the various aggravating and mitigating circumstances as per Bachan Singh, the Supreme Court laid down five categories where society might mandate judges to impose the death sentence. These were the manner of commission of murder, motive of the murder, anti-social or abhorrent nature of the crime, magnitude of the crime and personality of the victim. The Court also listed illustrative instances under each category.
It was stated that Bachan Singh laid down certain guidelines on choosing appropriate sentences, one of which required a balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be drawn up. In doing so the mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full weightage and a just balance has to be struck between the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances. In order to apply these guidelines inter-alia the courts must answer whether the crime rendered life imprisonment inadequate and whether the circumstances of the crime were such that there was no alternative but to impose the death sentence. Courts may proceed with imposing the death sentence if upon taking an overall global view of all the circumstances, the circumstances of the case are such that the death sentence is warranted.
v. Ravji alias Ram Chandra v. State of Rajasthan
Citation: 1996 (2) SCC 175
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 1595 of 1995
Coram: V.R Krishna Iyer, R.S Sarkaria, JJ.
Author: G.N. Ray, J.
Decided on: December 5, 1995
Full text available here
Facts
The appellant was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of his wife, his three minor children and a neighbour.
Findings
Looking at the facts and circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the appellant had a duty to protect and care for his wife and children. The brutality and heinousness of the crime, without any provocation, was sufficient to merit the death sentence. The Court noted that the Appellant was not remorseful as he did not attend the funeral of his wife and children.
It was held that the nature and gravity of the offence and not the criminal were germane for consideration of appropriate punishment in a criminal trial. The punishment must be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime is perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal.
vi. Swamy Shraddananda & Murali Manohar Mishra v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767
Citation: (2008) 13 SCC 767
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 454 of 2006
Coram: Aftab Alam, B.N. Agrawal, G.S. Singhvi, JJ.
Author: Aftab Alam, J.
Decided on: July 22, 2008
Full text available here
Facts
The Appellant was sentenced to death by both the trial court and the high court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the conviction was upheld but the Division Bench did not agree on the sentence. On the question of sentence, the case was referred to a larger Bench.
Findings
The Court held that in Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab five categories of murder were enumerated for the application of the rarest of rare principle to impose a death sentence. It was observed that this enlarged the scope of the death penalty which was sought to be restricted by Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab. The decision in Machhi Singh was rendered 25 years ago by looking at murder as an act of a maladjusted individual criminal. The Court felt that if a classification were to be made now, developments in kinds of crime seen in society presently would definitely find mention. Therefore, it was held that even though the categories framed in Machhi Singh provided useful guidelines, they could not be taken as inflexible and absolute, as Bachan Singh itself allowed for flexibility even in these categories.
It was noticed that in later decisions neither the rarest of rare cases principle nor the Machhi Singh categories were followed uniformly and consistently leading to a marked imbalance in the end results. These observations made the Court reluctant to confirm the death sentence. However, it was also felt that life imprisonment simpliciter was also unacceptable and therefore, the Court stipulated a special category of “fixed term sentence”.
vii. Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra
Citation: 2009 (6) SCC 498
Type:Criminal Appeal No. 1478 of 2005 and Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 2006
Coram: S.B Sinha, Cyriac Joseph, JJ.
Author: S.B Sinha, J.
Decided on: May 13, 2009
Full text available here
Facts
This was a case of kidnapping for ransom by four persons which lead to the murder of the person held hostage. The question before the Supreme Court was what weight should be given to mitigating circumstances while considering the question of sentence.
Findings
The Supreme Court interpreted the “rarest of rare” dictum in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab to consist of an “authoritative negative precept” that states that death ought not to be imposed except when the alternative of life imprisonment is completely out of the question. It formulated a two step test to determine whether a case deserves the death sentence- i.e., firstly, that the case belongs to the rarest of rare category; and secondly, that the option of life imprisonment would just not suffice.
For the first step, ascertaining whether a case fell into the “rarest of rare” category would require identification and balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances relating both to the crime and the criminal. For the second step of the test, the Court held that the alternative of life imprisonment is ‘unquestionably foreclosed’, only when the sentencing aim of reformation can be said to be achievable. For this, it held that “the court will have to provide clear evidence as to why the convict is not fit for any kind of reformatory and rehabilitation scheme”.
In the facts of the case, the death sentence was reduced to one of rigorous imprisonment for life.
viii. Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra
Citation: 2013 5 SCC 546
Type: Criminal Appeal Nos. 362-363 of 2010
Coram: K.S. Radhakrishnan, Madan B. Lokur, JJ.
Author: M B Lokur, J.
Decided on: April 25, 2013
Full text available here
Facts
The Appellant was convicted and sentenced to death for the rape and murder of a minor with intellectual disability. The Supreme Court commuted the sentence to life imprisonment.
Findings
It was held that the tests which need to be applied while imposing the sentence are the “crime test”, “criminal test” and the “R-R test” and not the “balancing test”. This, the court explained, meant that even if aggravating circumstances are present to the fullest extent and there are no mitigating circumstances favouring the accused, the rarest of the rare case test had to be applied before the court could impose the death sentence. The Court held that the application of the “rarest of rare” test depended on whether society would approve awarding of the death sentence. In his concurring opinion, Justice Lokur added that the Law Commission of India could examine whether the death penalty is a deterrent punishment or is retributive justice or serves an incapacitative goal.
It is pertinent to note that the Supreme Court in the case of Mahesh Dhanaji Shinde v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 4 SCC 292 held that the observations in Shankar Kishanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra might be contrary to Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab which had cautioned against treating aggravating and mitigating circumstances as watertight compartments.
ix. Sangeet v. State of Haryana
Citation: (2013) 2 SCC 452
Type: Criminal Appeal Nos. 490-491 of 2011
Coram: K.S. Radhakrishnan, Madan B. Lokur, JJ.
Author: Madan B. Lokur, J.
Decided on: November 20, 2012
Full text available here
Facts
There were multiple accused who were convicted for various offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Arms Act, 1959.
Findings
The Supreme Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment. The court observed that the aggravating circumstances pertained to the crime while mitigating circumstances referred to the criminal which are distinct elements incapable of being compared. Further, it was held that though Bachan Singh sought to shift focus from the crime to the crime and the criminal, the notion of principled sentencing had not developed and the circumstances of the criminal were not considered enough. The Court observed that Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab tried to standardize the procedure but in effect made sentencing judge centric and sentencing principles were not being applied uniformly. In light of this, the Court held that where there is uncertainty as to the propriety of punishment, awarding of life imprisonment does not stand unquestionably foreclosed.
x. Manoharan v. State by Inspector of Police
Citation: (2019) 7 SCC 716
Type: Criminal Appeal Nos. 1174-1175 of 2019
Coram: Rohinton Fali Nariman, Sanjiv Khanna, Surya Kant, JJ.
Author: Rohinton Fali Nariman, J.
Decided on: August 1, 2019
Full text available here
Facts
The Supreme Court was considering the appeal of a convictc sentenced to death for the rape and murder of a minor girl and the murder of her minor brother.
Findings
The Supreme Court, through the majority opinion of Justice Nariman, upheld the sentence of death imposed upon the appellant. Justice Sanjeev Khanna dissented on the question of sentence and chose the lesser sentence of life imprisonment without remission.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Khanna noted that the Court in Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab required two questions to be answered to determine if a case was rarest of rare. These were whether there was something uncommon about the crime which rendered life imprisonment inadequate and whether the circumstances of the crime were such that there was no alternative but to impose the death sentence. Justice Khanna opined that the five categories indicated by the Court in Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (manner of commission of murder, motive of the murder, anti-social or abhorrent nature of the crime, magnitude of the crime and personality of the victim) related to the first question. The second question also has to be answered which could be done by reference to mitigating circumstances. He reiterated that the death sentence could be imposed only when the sentence for life is unquestionably foreclosed.
In the facts of the case, Justice Khanna noted that the Appellant had confessed to the crime before a magistrate without compulsion and this, he stated, was the first step back into society and should be treated as a mitigating circumstance. He therefore opined that the appropriate punishment in this case would be life imprisonment without remission.
Role of Public Opinion
i. Dhananjoy Chatterjee alias Dhana v. State of West Bengal
Citation:(1994) 2 SCC 220
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 584 of 1992
Coram:Dr. A.S. Anand, N.P Singh, JJ.
Author: Dr. Anand, J.
Decided on: January 11, 1994
Full Text Available Here
Facts
The Appellant was convicted and sentenced to death for the rape and murder of an 18-year old girl. His conviction and death sentence were confirmed by the High Court.
Judgment
While confirming the death sentence, the Supreme Court held that the punishment must befit the crime so that courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime. It held that courts must consider not only the rights of the criminal, but also the rights of the victim and society at large while considering the question of appropriate sentence.
ii. Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra
2009 (6) SCC 498
Type: Criminal Appeal Nos. 1478 of 2005
Coram: S.B. Sinha, Cyriac Joseph, JJ.
Author: S.B. Sinha, J.
Decided on: May 13, 2009
Full Text Available Here
Facts
This was a case of kidnapping for ransom by four persons which lead to the murder of the person held hostage.
Findings
With respect to the impact of public opinion on death penalty adjudication, the Court held that it is difficult to fit public opinion in the rarest of rare matrix as it is inarticulate and is neither a circumstance relating to the crime nor to the criminal. The Court held that public opinion may also run counter to the rule of law and constitutionalism and since safeguards in capital sentencing continuously take strength from the Constitution, public opinion does not have any role to play on that end.
The Court commuted the sentence of death to life imprisonment in this case.
iii. M.A. Antony v. State of Kerala
Type: Review Petition (Criminal) No. 245 of 2010 in Criminal Appeal No. 811 of 2009
Coram: Madan B. Lokur, S. Abdul Nazeer, Deepak Gupta, JJ.
Author: Madan B. Lokur, J.
Decided on: December 12, 2018
Full Text Available Here
Facts
The Petitioner was sentenced to death for the murder of six persons. The conviction and death sentence were confirmed by the High Court and subsequently by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was considering the review petition filed to reconsider its own judgment upholding the death sentence.
Judgment
The Supreme Court commuted the death sentence into life imprisonment and noted that the trial court committed an error by taking into account the disturbance caused by the crime to the collective conscience of the society. It was held that reference to public opinion and what is perceived by the judges to be the collective conscience of the society must be avoided while sentencing a convict guilty of a brutal crime. The Court quoted with approval the opinion in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab and Santhosh Kumar Satishbushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra, that judges must not become spokesmen of public opinion and that they must exercise judicial restraint.
iv. Chhannu Lal Verma v. State of Chhattisgarh
Citation: (2019) 12 SCC 438
Type: Criminal Appeal Nos. 1482-83 of 2018
Coram: Kurian Joseph, Deepak Gupta, Hemant Gupta, JJ.
Author: Kurian Joseph, J. (Deepak Gupta And Hemant Gupta, JJ. partly disagreeing on the issue of constitutionality of Death Penalty in Supplementing Opinion).
Decided on: November 28, 2018
Full Text Available Here
Facts
The Appellant was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of three persons. Conviction and sentence were confirmed by the High Court and the appellant challenged both before the Supreme Court.
Judgment
While deliberating upon the propriety of death penalty, the Court emphasized on the duty of courts to be constitutionally correct, even if its views are counter-majoritarian. Public opinion is generally formed by emotionally charged narratives which need not necessarily be legally correct, properly informed. They may even be against the values of rule of law and constitutionalism that courts are bound by. The court reiterated the view in Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra that in death penalty sentencing, public opinion is neither an objective circumstance relating to crime nor to the criminal. The death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment after taking into consideration the possibility of reform and rehabilitation of the appellant that was evidenced by his good conduct in prison.
Mental Health and The Death Penalty
i. Shatrughan Chauhan and Another v. Union of India and Others
Citation:(2014) 3 SCC 1
Type: Writ Petitions (Criminal) No. 55 of 2013 with Nos. 34, 56, 132, 136, 139, 141, 187-88 and 190-93 of 2013
Coram: P. SATHasivam, C.J., and Ranjan Gogoi and Shiva Kirti Singh, JJ.
Author: P. Sathasivam, C.J.
Decided on: January 21, 2014
Full Text Available Here
Facts
The Supreme Court considered a batch of writ petitions that were filed either by or on behalf of 15 death convicts challenging the rejection of their mercy petitions by the Governor and the President. In two of these petitions, commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment was prayed for on the ground of mental illness.
Findings
Insanity/mental illness/schizophrenia is a crucial supervening circumstance, which should be considered by this Court in deciding whether in the facts and circumstances of the case death sentence could be commuted to life imprisonment. The SC also noted that keeping a convict in suspense while consideration of his mercy petition by the President for many years causes agony, it creates adverse physical conditions and psychological stresses on the convict under sentence of death. Indisputably, this Court, while considering the rejection of the clemency petition by the President, under Article 32 read with Article 21 of the Constitution, cannot excuse the agonizing delay caused to the convict only on the basis of the gravity of the crime.
ii. Navneet Kaur v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another
Citation:(2014) 7 SCC 264
Type: Curative Petition (Criminal) No. 88 Of 2013 in Review Petition (Criminal) No. 435 of 2013 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 146 of 2011
Coram: P. Sathasivam, C.J., and R.M. Lodha, H.L. Dattu and S.J. Mukhopadhaya, JJ.
Author: P. Sathasivam, C.J.
Decided on: March 31, 2014
Full Text Available Here
Facts
This was a curative petition against the dismissal of the writ petition (and subsequent review petition) filed by the wife of a convict sentenced to death, challenging the rejection of mercy by the President.
Findings
Pending the disposal of the curative petition, it was brought to the notice of the Court that the Standing Medical Board which examined the accused had diagnosed him with severe depression with psychotic features and considered his chances of recovery as doubtful. The Court stated that the medical condition of the accused was a supervening circumstance and the accused could not be executed. Relying on the law laid down in Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014) 3 SCC 1, the curative bench commuted the sentence of death to life imprisonment.
iii. Accused X v. State of Maharashtra
Citation:(2019) 7 SCC 1
Type: Review Petition (Criminal) No. 301 of 2008 in Criminal Appeal No. 680 of 2007
Coram: N.V. Ramana, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Indira Banerjee, Jj.
Author: N.V. Ramana, J.
Decided on: April 12, 2019
Full Text Available Here
Facts
The Supreme Court was deciding a review petition in a case where the Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death for the rape and murder of two minor girls. One of the questions for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether post-conviction mental illness of the accused would qualify as a mitigating factor for commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment.
Findings
The Supreme Court in this case recognized post conviction mental illness as a mitigating factor to convert death penalty to life imprisonment. The SC noting that there appear to be no set disorders/disabilities for evaluating the ‘severe mental illness’ laid down ‘test of severity’ as a guiding factor for recognizing those mental illnesses which qualify for an exemption. The court noted that these disorders generally include schizophrenia, other serious psychotic disorders, and dissociative disorders with schizophrenia. Therefore, the test envisaged herein predicates that the offender needs to have a severe mental illness or disability, which simply means that a medical professional would objectively consider the illness to be most serious so that he cannot understand or comprehend the nature and purpose behind the imposition of such punishment.The notion of death penalty and the sufferance it brings along causes incapacitation and is idealised to invoke a sense of deterrence. If the accused is not able to understand the impact and purpose of his execution because of his disability, the raison d’etre for the execution itself collapses.
iv. Md. Mannan @ Abdul Mannan v. State of Bihar
Citation: 2019 SCC Online SC 737
Type:Review Petition (Criminal) No. 308 of 2011 in Criminal Appeal No. 379 of 2009
Coram: N.V. Ramana, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Indira Banerjee, JJ.
Decided on: February 14, 2019
Full Text Available Here
Facts
The Supreme Court was deciding a review petition in a case where the Petitioner was convcited and sentenced to death for the murder and rape of a minor.
Findings
The Court took note of the submission of the counsel that the Petitioner was found to lose his sense of reality during his conservation and had talked of being possessed by imaginary personalities (Jinns). It also took judicial notice of the opinion of a psychiatrist, Dr Kaustubh Joag, who was consulted by the counsel for the accused based on the transcripts of the conversations he had with him. Dr Joag in his report said that there is a strong possibility that the prisoner might be suffering from “organic (neurological) and/or mental health issues”.
By relying on the dictum in Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, the Court concluded that the mental health of the Petitioner at the time of execution is a relevant mitigating factor which must be taken into consideration. The death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment without remission.
v. Gopalan Nair v. State of Kerala
Citation:(1973) 1 SCC 469
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 256 of 1972
Coram:A.K. Mukherjea, A.N. Grover and K.K. Mathew, JJ.
Decided on: December 22, 1972
Full Text Available Here
Facts
The appellant was accused of an offence under Section 302, Indian Penal Code. The trial court found the accused guilty and sentenced the accused to death. On appeal, the appellant claimed that he was of unsound mind and the defence which was put up was that he was of unsound mind at the time of the incident and the benefit of Section 84, Indian Penal Code, was sought. The High Court negatived that defence. The SC allowed the appeal to the extent of reducing the sentence to one of life imprisonment instead of death.
Findings
The SC noted that the Appellant had some sort of mental trouble prior to the date of the occurrence (the appellant had been admitted to the mental hospital three years prior to the incident). There was nothing to show that he was not suffering from a mental obsession which may not amount to insanity but which would affect a person's mind in a way quite different from that of a normal person. The SC observed that the origin of the incident was not known. If he had been quite normal his reactions might have been different. He was in all likelihood not in a position to weigh and analyse in a rational manner and held that the lesser penalty for an offence under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, should be imposed.
i. Shabnam v. Union of India
Citation:(2015) 6 SCC 702
Type: WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 88-89 OF 2015
Coram: A.K. SIKRI AND UDAY UMESH LALIT, JJ.
Author: A.K. SIKRI, J.
Decided on: MAY 27, 2015
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Facts
A writ petition was filed in the Supreme Court by two prisoners on death row, challenging the death warrant issued by the trial court just 6 days after their appeal had been dismissed by the Supreme Court.
Findings
The Court ruled that it was impermissible to issue a death warrant when judicial and administrative remedies are still pending in a death sentence case. In this case it held that the limitation period for filing a review and thereafter reasonable time to file mercy petition had to be given to the petitioners. The Supreme Court also gave its stamp of approval to the guidelines given by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) v. Union of India & Ors. (2015) SCC Online All 143 and made it mandatory in all cases:
- The convict must be given notice of the warrant to be issued by the Sessions Court so that she can arrange for a counsel to represent her.
- The death warrant must specify the exact date and time of the execution.
- There must be a reasonable period of time between the date of order on the warrant and the date of execution so that the convict can pursue legal recourse against the warrant and meet her family.
- A copy of the warrant must be immediately supplied to the convict.
- Where required the convict must be provided with legal aid.
ii. Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra
Citation: (2015) 9 SCC 552
Type: Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 129 OF 2015
Coram: Dipak Misra, Prafulla C. Pant and Amitava Roy, JJ.
Author: Dipak Misra, J.
Decided on: July 29, 2015
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Facts
The trial court had issued a death warrant against the petitioner, without giving him notice, setting the date of execution at 90 days. In the meanwhile, the curative petition filed by the petitioner had been dismissed and he filed another mercy petition, his first one having been already rejected.
Findings
The Supreme Court held that the pendency of the second mercy petition would have no effect of staying the death warrant as the first mercy petition had already been rejected, and the petitioner had not challenged that rejection. Further, it held that the fact that notice was not given to the petitioner before issuance of death warrants would not vitiate it (in terms of the law in Shabnam), as the petitioner had in fact availed his legal remedies subsequently, by filing a curative petition.
The second mercy petition was also subsequently dismissed after this judgment was pronounced, and thereafter the petitioner approached the Apex Court again, seeking time to challenge the rejection. The Supreme Court refused to stay the death warrants again, on the ground that the rejection of the first mercy petition had not been challenged.
Sentencing Procedures
i. Jawed Khan @ Tingrya v. State of Maharashtra
Type: Criminal Appeal 622-623 of 2016
Coram: A.K. Sikri, S. Abdul Nazeer, M.R. Shah, JJ.
Decided on: February 6, 2019
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Facts
This was an appeal in the Supreme Court against death sentence enhanced by the High Court for conviction under offences pertaining to rape and murder.
Findings
In this case, the Supreme Court drew a direct link between the prison conduct of the convict and his ability to reform. While in jail the Appellant had participated in the examination on Gandhian Thoughts organized by the Sahyog Trust based on the life and teachings of Mahatma Gandhi. The Court also noted that the Appellant had also qualified B.P.P. (Bachelor Preparatory Programme) from Indira Gandhi National Open University ("IGNOU") which qualifies him to get admission in B.A. and was pursuing B.A. course from IGNOU. The Court considered all of this as material on record to show that the Appellant was on the path to reformation, and may have even become reformed. Consequently the Court commuted the sentence of death to life imprisonment.
ii. Dyaneshwar Suresh Borkar v. State of Maharashtra
Citation: (2019) 15 SCC 546
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 1411 of 2018
Coram: A.K. Sikri, S. Abdul Nazeer, M.R. Shah, JJ.
Author: M.R. Shah, J.
Decided on: February 20, 2019
Full text available here
Facts
This was an appeal against sentence of death imposed for the offence of kidnapping and murder of a minor boy. The appeal had already been dismissed in limine by the Supreme Court in 2006, and was restored back to the appeal stage in the review hearing in 2018.
Findings
In this judgment, the Supreme Court again looked at the prison conduct of the Appellant to understand his ability to reform. While commuting the death sentence, the Court took notice of the fact that the Appellant completed his graduation from jail in B.A, and had written poems in jail that evidenced his remorse and reform. The Court held that these circumstances show that the Appellant would not commit similar criminal acts in the future. The other mitigating circumstances in this case were the young age of the Appellant at the time of the offence (22-23 years); the fact that he has undergone 18 years of incarceration; and that he did not have prior criminal antecedents.
iii. Bharat Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi
Type: Death Sentence Reference No. 1 Of 2013 and Criminal Appeal No. 509 of 2013 (High Court Of Delhi)
Coram: S. Muralidhar, Mukta Gupta, JJ.
Author: S. Muralidhar, J.
Decided on: October 31, 2014
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Facts
This was a confirmation case before the High Court of Delhi wherein the Appellant had been sentenced to death for the offence of raping and murdering a minor.
Findings
The High Court upheld the conviction imposed by the Trial Court. On the question of sentence, it noted that no material had been placed by the State to show whether the Appellant could be reformed and rehabilitated in terms of the dictum of Bachan Singh. Thus, in a first of its kind move, the Court called for a report from a Probation Officer to see if the accused would be a continuing threat to society and if there was a probability that the accused can be reformed and rehabilitated.
Pursuant to this, a detailed Social Investigation Report (SIR) was filed by the Probation Officer based on personal interviews with the Appellant, interviews with his family members and neighbours, the report of the local panchayat and a report from the Police Station. The SIR also incorporated inputs of the Clinical Psychologist, Psychiatric Social Worker and Superintendent of Jail as well as the assessment by the Medical Board of the Institute of Human Behaviour and Allied Sciences (IHBAS). The SIR recommended that the Appellant may be reformed with the intervention of social correctional measures. The Delhi High Court concluded that there existed a probability that the Appellant could be reformed and rehabilitated and therefore, commuted the sentence to Life Imprisonment.
iv. Anil @ Anthony Arikswamy Joseph v. State Of Maharashtra
Citation: (2014) 4 SCC 69
Type: Criminal Appeal Nos.1419-1420 of 2012
Coram: K.S. Radhakrishnan, Vikramajit Sen, JJ.
Author: K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.
Decided on: February 20, 2014
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Facts
The Appellant was convicted and sentenced to death for subjecting a 10 year old boy to carnal intercourse and strangulating him. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment without remission for a minimum of term of 30 years.
Findings
The Supreme Court held that while determining sentence Courts take for granted that the accused would be a menace to society and there is no possibility of reformation and rehabilitation, while it is the duty of the Court to ascertain those factors. The State is obliged to furnish materials for and against the possibility of reformation and rehabilitation of the accused. The Supreme Court directed that criminal courts, while dealing with offences like Section 302 Indian Penal Code, 1860 may call for a report to determine whether the accused could be reformed or rehabilitated.
v. Mukesh and anr. v. State for NCT of Delhi and ors.
Citation: (2017) 3 SCC 717
Type: Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 3119-3120 of 2014
Coram: Dipak Misra, R. Banumathi, Ashok Bhushan, JJ.
Author: Dipak Misra, J.
Decided on: February 3, 2017
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Facts
The Appellants were convicted for the rape and murder of a 23 year old woman.
Findings
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the mandate of Section 235 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not followed by the lower courts as aggravating and mitigating circumstances were not considered in respect of each individual accused. The Court stated that there are two modes to cure sentencing defects- 1. to remand the matter; 2. to direct the accused persons to produce necessary data and advance the contention on the question of sentence. Following the second mode, the Court gave an opportunity to the accused persons to file affidavits along with documents stating the mitigating circumstances. The counsels for the accused were allowed daily visits to the jail in order to communicate with the accused persons and file the requisite affidavits and materials. The final judgment in this case was delivered on May 5, 2017 reported as Mukesh and Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2017) 6 SCC 1.
vi. In Re- Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons (2019) 2 SCC 435
Citation: (2019) 2 SCC 435
Type: IA No. 26542 of 2018 in Writ Petition (Civil) 406 of 2013
Coram: Madan B. Lokur, S. Abdul Nazeer, Deepak Gupta JJ.
Author: Madan B. Lokur, J.
Decided on: December 13, 2018
Full text available here
Facts
In 2013 a letter written by Retd. Justice R.C. Lahoti to the then Chief Justice of India was admitted as a writ petition seeking to remedy the inhuman conditions in 1382 prisons in India. Following this, a series of directions were passed between 2016-2018 to remedy the situation.
Findings
By the instant order, the Supreme Court held that prisoners on death row are permitted to have meetings and interviews with their lawyers or members of their immediate family or even mental health professionals. It was held that the view expressed in Francis Coralie Mullin v. State (UT of Delhi) (1981) 1 SCC 608 would be equally applicable to death row prisoners for meeting mental health professionals for a reasonable period of time with reasonable frequency so that their rights can be adequately protected at all stages.
vii. Md. Mannan @ Abdul Mannan v. State of Bihar
Type: Review Petition (Criminal) No. 308 of 2011 in Criminal Appeal No. 379 Of 2009
Coram: N.V. Ramana, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, Indira Banerjee, JJ.
Decided on: February 14, 2019
Full text available here
Facts
In this case the Supreme Court was deciding a review petition of a convict sentenced to death for the rape and murder of a minor.
Findings
It was held by the Supreme Court that the imposition of death sentence on the same day as the conviction may not, in itself, vitiate the sentence, provided that the convict is given a meaningful and effective hearing on the question of sentence under Section 235(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 with an opportunity to bring on record mitigating factors. Advancement by the Trial Court of hearing under Section 235(2) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 at a short notice, which in effect provided no notice, denied the Petitioner an effective hearing.
The Court noted that in terms of the procedure adopted in Mukesh v. State for NCT of Delhi, the legal representative of the Petitioner had met him and his family members and presented that information before the Supreme Court in the review proceedings. The opinion of Dr Kaustubh Joag, a psychiatrist was also presented to the Court which took judicial notice of it.
The death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment without remission by the Supreme Court
Residual Doubt
i. Ashok Debbarma Alias Achak Debbarma V. State Of Tripura
Citation: (2014) 4 SCC 747
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 47-48 of 2013
Coram:K.S.P. Radhakrishnan and Vikramajit Sen, JJ
Author: K.S.P. Radhakrishnan, J.
Decided on: March 4, 2014
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Facts
This was a case involving the killing of fifteen people by a large mob, of which only one person was convicted and sentenced to death.
Findings
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant, but commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment with a minimum of twenty years. In doing so, it introduced the concept of ‘residual doubt’ as a mitigating circumstance in Indian sentencing jurisprudence. The Court stated that there could be a state of lingering uncertainty that exists, beyond ‘reasonable doubt’ but below ‘absolute certainty’. In the facts of the case, the residual doubt that the Court had pertained to whether the appellant alone could have executed such a crime, especially when the prosecution’s case was that there were multiple accused persons.
ii. Sudam Alias Rahul Kumar Kaniram Jadhav V. State Of Maharashtra
(2019) 9 SCC 388
Type: Review Petition No. 401-402 of 2012
Coram: N.V. Ramana,mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Indira Banerjee, JJ.
Author: Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J.
Decided on:October 1,2019
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Facts
In this case, the Supreme Court was deciding the review petition of a convict sentenced to death for the murder of his wife and his four children by strangulating them.
Findings
The Court relied upon the principle of ‘residual doubt’ evolved in Ashok Debbarma v. State of Tripura, and observed that the Supreme Court has on several occasions held the quality of evidence to a higher standard for passing a sentence of death. In the facts of the case, the Court held that though the evidence was sufficient to convict the Petitioner, however, the nature of the circumstantial evidence in this case amounts to a mitigating circumstance.
The Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life, without remission.
iii. Ravishankar V. State Of Madhya Pradesh
Citation: (2019) 9 SCC 689
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 1523-24 of 2019)
Coram: Rohinton Fali Nariman, R. Subhash Reddy And Surya Kant, JJ
Author: Surya Kant, J.
Decided on: October 3, 2019
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Facts
The appellant had been sentenced to death for raping and murdering a minor, and was before the Supreme Court in appeal.
Findings
The Court reiterated the “residual doubt” principle of Ashok Debbarma v. State of Tripura, and held that it creates a higher standard of proof over and above the “beyond reasonable doubt” threshold in order to sentence someone to death.
In the facts of the case, the Court expressed its residual doubt on the nature of evidence. It observed that a crucial witness for constructing the last seen theory was partially inconsistent in cross examination. Two other witnesses failed to inspire confidence, and there was an inconsistency between the post-mortem report and the panchnama filed by the police. Therefore, it was held that the present matter did not meet the standard of proof required for imposing the death penalty, and the sentence was commuted to life-imprisonment without remission for the rest of life.
iv. Shatrughana Baban Meshram V. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 1 SCC 596
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 763-764 of 2016
Coram: U.U. Lalit, Indu Malhotra, Krishna Murari JJ.
Author: U.U. Lalit, J.
Decided on: November 2, 2020
Full text available here
Facts
The accused was convicted for a rape and murder of a two and half year old girl and sentenced to death by the Trial Court. The conviction and sentence were confirmed by the High Court, against which the accused appealed before the Supreme Court in the present case.
Findings
The Court observed that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, circumstances must not only be individually proved or established, but also must form a consistent chain, so conclusive as to rule out the possibility of any other hypothesis except the guilt of the accused. As such, it was the court’s opinion that the burden in such cases was already of a greater magnitude. It held that once that burden was discharged, it would be implicit that any other hypothesis or the innocence of the accused already stood ruled out at the stage of sentence after returning the finding of guilt. Therefore, the court observed that theoretically the concept or theory of “residual doubt” would not have any place in a case based on circumstantial evidence. In discussing previous Supreme Court decisions where ‘residual doubt’ was referred to in sentencing, the court observed that in those cases “the matters were considered from the standpoint of individual fact situation where, going by the higher or stricter standard for imposition of death penalty, alternative to death sentence was found to be appropriate”. The court held that lesser punishment than death sentence was not foreclosed and imposed life imprisonment for 25 years.
Supreme Court's Appellate and Review Jurisdiction
i. Vikram Singh and Anr v. State of Punjab
Citation:(2017) 8 SCC 518
Type:Review Petition (Criminal) Nos. 192-193 Of 2011 and Criminal Appeal Nos. 1396-1397 of 2008
Coram:Dipak Misra, R. Banumathi and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.
Author: Ashok Bhushan, J.
Decided on: July 7, 2017
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Facts
The Supreme Court was deciding the review petition in a case where the two petitioners had been sentenced to death for the offence of kidnapping and murder. The appeals had been dismissed by the Supreme Court in 2010.
Fingings
The Court dismissed the review petition, and upheld the sentence of death on the two petitioners. In doing so, it looked at various precedents on the scope of review petitions under Article 137 of the Constitution of India, 1950. It held that merely showing that another view maybe possible on conviction or sentence is not a ground for review, and there has to be a ‘material error manifest on the face of the record’.
This was the first death sentence case post Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India and Ors. (2014) 9 SCC 737 where the Supreme Court defined the contours of its review jurisdiction.
ii. Babasaheb Maruti Kamble v. State of Maharashtra
Citation:(2019) 13 SCC 631
Type: Review Petition (Criminal) Nos. 388 of 2015 in SPecial Leave Petition (Criminal) Nos. 458 of 2015
Coram: Dr. A.K. Sikri, Ashok Bhushan and Indira Banerjee, JJ.
Author: Dr. A.K. Sikri, J.
Decided on: November 1, 2018
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Facts
The Supreme Court was deciding the review petition in a case where the petitioner had been sentenced to death for the offence of rape and murder. The appeals had been dismissed by the Supreme Court in 2015 in limine (dismissed at the threshold without reasons).
Findings
The Court recalled the order dismissing the Special Leave Petition (SLP) in limine and restored it to its original number. Thereafter, the Court commuted the sentence of death to life imprisonment for at least twenty five years. The Court also looked at various judgments to uphold the principle that in death sentence cases there has to be an independent appreciation of evidence, unbound by the findings of the trial and High Court. The Court held that an SLP filed in a death sentence case should not be dismissed without reasons, at least qua the death sentence.
Life Imprisonment Without Remission
i. Maru Ram v. Union of India
Citation: (1981) 1 SCC 107
Type: Writ Petition No, 865 of 1979
Coram: Y.V. Chandrachud, CJ., P.N. Bhagwati, V.R. Krishna Iyer, Syed Mutaza Fazalai And A.D. Koshal, JJ.
Author: V Krisna Iyer, J.
Decided on: November 11, 1980
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Facts
Over two thousand life convicts challenged the constitutionality of the newly legislated Section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) before a five judge bench of the Supreme Court.
Findings
The Court examined Section 433A of the CrPC, a provision brought in place a mandatory minimum of 14 years before which a person sentenced to life imprisonment for a capital offence could be considered for remission. It held the law to be constitutionally valid, as it was neither arbitrary nor irrational. The Court further laid down the law that life imprisonment meant imprisonment till the end of life, subject to the appropriate government choosing to release the prisoner in terms of Section 433A of the CrPC.
ii. Swamy Shraddhanada @ Murli Manohar Mishra v. State of Karnataka
Citation: (2008) 13 SCC 767
Type: Criminal Appeal No. 454 OF 2006
Coram: Aftab Alam, B.N. Agrawal And G.S. Singhvi, JJ.
Author: Aftab Alam, J.
Decided on: July 22, 2008
Full Text Available Here
Facts
A two judge bench of the Supreme Court hearing a death sentence appeal differed on the question of sentence, with Justice Katju choosing to uphold the death sentence and Justice Sinha seeking to commute to life. The matter came before a three judge bench to resolve the conflict.
Findings
The three judge bench of the Supreme Court opted to commute the death sentence to life imprisonment. In doing so, it chose to create a via media between what it saw as life imprisonment simpliciter and the death sentence, by creating a special category of sentence, the ‘fixed term sentence’. These are life sentences that would have a fixed minimum term, ranging from 20 years, 30 years upto the end of life, and for such term there could be no remission of sentence by the appropriate government. In this case, the Supreme Court imposed the condition that there will be no remission for the rest of the prisoner’s life.
iii. Union of India v. V. Sriharan @Murugun
Citation: (2016) 7 SCC 1
Type: Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 48 OF 2014
Coram: HL Dattu, C.J., Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, Pinaki Chandra Ghose, Abhay Manohar Sapre And Uday Umesh Lalit, JJ.
Author: Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J. (For the Majority), Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. (For the Minority), Uday Umesh Lalit, J. (For the Minority)
Decided on: December 2, 2015
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Facts
A number of questions of law pertaining to remission powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were referred to a Constitution Bench, in a matter relating to the question of remission and premature release of the Rajiv Gandhi assassination convicts by the Tamil Nadu government. One of the questions involved the validity of the special category of sentence as created by Swamy Shraddhanada @ Murli Manohar Mishra v. State of Karnataka.
Findings
On this specific question, the Court, speaking through the majority opinion of Justice Kalifulla held that the special category of sentence created by Swamy Shraddhanada @ Murli Manohar Mishra v. State of Karnataka was valid in law. It further added that such a sentence could only be imposed by the High Courts or the Supreme Court. However, the constitutional powers of remission under Article 72 and 161 would be unaffected by such a sentence.
The dissenting judges, Justice Lalit and Sapre, speaking through Justice Lalit held that such a sentence was not valid in law as it would amount to legislating a new sentence, and it was also trenching into the domain of the executive.